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Heydemann, and other political economists. Perthes builds on their arguments, adding volu-
minous detail and nuanced observations in a highly readable volume suitable for classroom 
use. His arguments should also provoke considerable debate among scholars wedded to alter-
native conceptions of Syrian politics. But all entrants to this debate will have to take seri-
ously the evidence he marshals on behalf of his conclusions. 
TIMOTHY J. PIRO, The Political Economy of Market Reform in Jordan (Lanham, Md., Row-
man & Littlefield, 1998). Pp. 149. $19.95 paper. 
REVIEWED BY CURTIS R. RYAN, Department of Political Science and International Affairs, 
Mary Washington College, Fredericksburg, Va. 
Like many countries, Jordan has been attempting for more than a decade to comply with the 
norms of an increasingly globalized world economic order, and hence with the norms of the 
post-industrial states of the North. These norms include privatization, lower tariffs, reduced gov-
ernment subsidies, and a general shift to a free market economy. The process of adjustment, 
however, has not been easy. Indeed, in the Jordanian case, each round of IMF-directed economic 
restructuring has triggered rioting throughout the kingdom (particularly in 1989 and 1996). 
Yet despite the importance of Jordan in Middle Eastern politics, and the importance of these 
questions of economic adjustment, there nevertheless remains a dearth of published scholarly 
research on Jordanian politics-particularly on the political economy of the kingdom. In this 
short book, Timothy Piro aims to help fill that gap in the literature with a political-economic 
study of the difficulties of market reform in Jordan. 
At the outset (p. vii), Piro poses a clear and important question: why is it that govern-
ments that favor privatization and economic adjustment find themselves intervening repeat-
edly in the economy anyway? Why, in other words, does state behavior actually seem to 
block the professed goals of state policy? To answer these questions, the author draws on 
field research, interviews with public- and private-sector officials, and a good deal of Arabic 
and English documentary source material. This includes extensive research on the "Big 
Five" public-sector companies in Jordan (cement, phosphates, petroleum, potash, and fertil-
izers), which are central to any hopes for substantial privatization in the kingdom. 
Piro argues (in my view correctly) that privatization and economic adjustment cannot be 
understood as purely economic processes; they are, rather, deeply political. He therefore makes 
a strong and welcome case for a political-economy approach to understanding the Jordanian 
experience as well as that of other developing countries. The author makes a point of plac-
ing his case study of Jordan in a global, as well as a Middle Eastern, context. In doing so, he 
positions his research not only in the realm of area studies, but also in a broader comparative 
context, with specific references, for example, to Latin America and East Asia (p. 3). 
Piro also explicitly recognizes that Jordanian politics from the 1950s to 1999 amounted to 
more than palace intrigues or the whims of King Hussein. "Examining the process of market 
reform in Jordan," he notes in the Preface "uncovers other centers of power beyond the pal-
ace" (p. xii). Because it focuses on the Jordanian state and society, rather than solely on the 
king himself, the study was in no way outdated by the passing of King Hussein and the 
accession of King Abdullah II. "The state," for Piro, is neither of the traditional Weberian nor 
the Marxist type. He sees it neither as a neutral referee between competing interests nor as 
the captured tool of a dominant social class. In this study, the state is seen as an actor with 
interests of its own. 
Piro's main argument is that domestic variables, not external or systemic ones, best ex-
plain the difficulty of achieving true market reform in Jordan. The author might have ex-
plained, however, what he means specifically when he describes the public-private-sector 
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relationship as "parasitic" (p. 74). On the other hand, his broader conclusion on the same 
page is crystal clear: Piro rejects explanations for market-reform failure that are based either 
on global dependence or individual incompetence; rather, he focuses on the politics of do-
mestic political coalitions within the kingdom and sees the failure as rooted in the nature of 
the link between the state and the economy. He argues that this requires an analysis of the 
nature of the state itself, which in turn must be traced back to the emergence of Hashemite 
rule. When Emir Abdullah first extended his power over Transjordan, he presided over a 
small state and a weak private sector. The state itself therefore expanded and filled the eco-
nomic void. There has been no time in modern Jordanian history, in short, when the public 
sector did not outweigh the private sector. 
But why is it so difficult to reverse this trend? Piro argues that the key lies in that very pro-
cess of state formation, and particularly in the extension of patrimonial ties and co-optive 
links from the state to key domestic coalitions. The act of privatization today thus threatens 
those same ties, and hence the interests of key coalitions within the government and public-
sector industries. One might expect, however, that an economic reformist coalition within the 
state might then rely more strongly on the private sector. But here Piro notes correctly the 
extensive overlap between individuals in these sectors. Jordan's private-sector elites often 
migrate to public-sector or government posts, or vice versa. In sum, the lines between public 
and private elites tend to be blurry at best, further hampering the cause of privatization. 
It is important to note that in using the term "patrimonial," Piro is not reverting to cultural 
determinism. His argument does not turn on explanations of Arab, Islamic, or Asian culture. 
Rather, he emphasizes the relative lateness of industrialization in Jordan and the nature of state 
formation from the period of the British Mandate. Thus, to understand why the "interventionist" 
state continues in Jordan, we must look to its historical development. 
But one must then expect the author to take on the cause of market reform itself. He 
notes that it has become a "panacea," but leaves us with no real indication of whether he sees 
that as a good thing or not. Piro's detailed and methodical account makes clear why market 
reform can be so elusive. A key normative question, however, remains unanswered: should 
Jordan, or any other state for that matter, pursue this panacea? Is this an obstacle to be over-
come, or a sign that the policy itself is unwise? While the answers remain unclear to these 
questions, Piro does suggest that Jordan's pursuit of market reform will continue to be prob-
lematic at best. Privatization, he argues, has been watered down to "commercialization," and 
thus Jordan appears in many respects to be speaking in neo-liberal terms while pursuing a 
neo-mercantilist strategy of economic development (p. 90). 
For Piro, the domestic constraints appear to be far too great to expect anything more than 
a kind of state-capitalist model. But that seems only to underscore the adaptability of this 
political-economy analysis to other regions undergoing similar experiences. Scholars, policy-
makers, and would-be economic reformers in Latin America, East Asia, and Eastern Europe, 
for example, may find useful lessons in this analysis. The book will also be of interest to 
those concerned with theoretical debates about the nature of the state, strategies of develop-
ment, and economic adjustment. For students of Jordanian politics, this short, tightly focused 
book provides a welcome insight into the political economy of the kingdom and to the 
problems of market reform in the Middle East. 
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Islamic Law and Finance is an ambitious undertaking by two scholars in different fields, one 
in Islamic law and the other in business and finance, to collaborate on a work of Islamic 
